Corona Claims Hacienda Luisita Decision is Reason for Impeachment Against Him

Suggesting he singlehandedly prevented the payment of TEN BILLION PESOS to the owners of Hacienda Luisita, the Chief Justice Renato Corona claims in this part of an exclusive interview with Arnold Clavio just this morning, that this is the root and reason for the impeachment move against him.

Corona Wanted To Prove Justice Sereno a Liar in the Impeachment Court

The impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona had some remarks about Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno during his interview with GMANews' Arnold Clavio broadcast on television this morning.  I shall leave it to the readers of Philippine Commentary to decide what to make out of all these remarkable statements.    

Chief Justice Corona Says Associate Justice Antonio Carpio Wants His Job

In an exclusive interview broadcast on GMANews this morning, the impeached Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines went on the offensive as the Senate Impeachment Court decided to accept certain potentially damaging pieces of evidence against him.  But he had some interesting things to say about his fellow Justice on the High Court, Antonio Carpio.  Corona claims Carpio wants to be Chief Justice and broadly hints the latter is behind "black propaganda" against him. (Corona spoke to Arnold Clavio of GMANews directly to the Public, in an apparent nod that the Court of Public Opinion is also trying his case!))



The cutting remarks of the Chief Justice against Justice Carpio give us a RARE GLIMPSE into Supreme Court in-fighting.

Impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona Speaks Out (on TV!)

The impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona on trial in the Senate Impeachment Court, has given an exclusive interview to Arnold Clavio of GMANews television, aired earlier today by the nationwide network. In the following segment, listen to the Chief Justice explaining WHY he and his wife Christina suddenly closed several bank accounts in the Philippine Savings Bank on December 12, 2011, the day the House of Representatives impeached him.

Enrile on Impeachment: A Line in the Sand?

Below is  Juan Ponce Enrile's Opinion on Impeachment delivered in the course of heated debates over a Supreme Court TRO on a subpoena by the Senate Court to the Philippine Savings to produce bank records of what have turned out to be foreign currency deposits (dollar accounts) of the accused Chief Justice Renato C. Corona:
(via @rapplerdotcom):

"May I now state the position of this humble presiding officer. And this position is subject to the opinion of the court, of the Senate sitting as an impeachment court.

"In the humble view of the presiding officer, the Senate as an impeachment court must at all times observe the rule of law.

"It cannot transgress any of the applicable provisions of the bill of rights. It must be guided by the presumption of innocence, before the pronouncement of guilt. It must at all times observe the principle of procedural and substantial due process.

"It cannot use its power to issue compulsory process or processes to compel any witness to appear and testify and in testifying is forced to commit a crime. It cannot compel a witness to testify against himself.

"It cannot arbitrarily declare a person guilty of contempt and deprive of that person his or her liberty.

"It cannot violate the laws passed by Congress of which it is an integral part.

"That is the humble position of this presiding officer of this Senate sitting as an impeachment court.

"Now, as far as the subpoena duces tecum involved, which was issued by this presiding officer upon the behest of the prosecution, this presiding officer assumes full responsibility for issuing that subpoena. And is ready to defend his position in any court of law if there is a need for that.

"I will not pass the buck to the Senate sitting as an impeachment court. It was my decision as the presiding officer and I am personally bound to assume the consequences of my action as a presiding officer.

"Having said that, I do not wish to delve on the issue [on the] exercise to issue compulsory processes by this court in this particular instance involving Republic Acts 1405 and 6426.

"I do not want to make any pronouncement on that because precisely this court, through this presiding officer, exercised the discretion to heed the request of the prosecution to issue a subpoena duces tecum to help them obtain the evidence they wanted in the face of proscriptions by laws of the land passed by Congress.

"And that is the subject matter now of the case before the Supreme Court filed by a private party asserting its rights under the laws of this country and under the Constitution to be protected from any liability, and that is the reason for which the Supreme Court issued a TRO.

"And that is the reason why this court, or a majority of this court, yesterday ruled, in an open, uninfluenced voting that the court must respect the order of the Supreme Court to issue its temporary restraining order.

"Whether or not in the end this court abused its discretion or committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction will be decided...by the Supreme Court being the highest court of the land and the final arbiter and interpreter of the Constitution of this country.

"For no one else was given by the sovereign people in their Constitution the power to make a final determination or interpretation of what the Constitution ought to be or what a law ought to be except the Supreme Court.

"Not the executive. Not congress. But only the Supreme Court.

"And so it is my bounded duty as the presiding officer of this impeachment court to respect the authority, the power of the Supreme Court to review acts of this impeachment court, in interlocutory matters, meaning, matters bearing on the manner which this court will conduct the trial of this particular impeachment case.

"But it is my humble view that the Supreme Court, in spite of the fact that it has the power of judicial review, cannot assume jurisdiction over the power, the sole power of this Senate sitting as an impeachment court to try and decide this impeachment case.

"That is the position of this humble presiding officer."

As the Senate President says at the outset, this opinion is yet to be discussed by the Senate Court. Doubtless it will be debated at length and modified somewhat, but I expect its most durable features to survive into the Majority view.

The most important of these may be the distinction JPE draws between a POWER and a JURISDICTION, between the Supreme Court's power of Judicial Review and the Senate's sole power as Impeachment Court to TRY and DECIDE all cases of impeachment and the JURISDICTION in which each power is applicable under the 1987 Constitution.

In particular, JPE believes the Supreme Court may exercise judicial review over INTERLOCUTORY MATTERS, by which he means the "manner" by which the Senate Impeachment Court conducts the trial, but draws a Line in the Sand beyond which not even the Supreme Court may cross: it may not take jurisdiction over "the power, the sole power of the Senate to try and decide this case." which is explicitly stated in the 1987 Constitution's Article 11 Section 3.6-8:

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

The Supreme Court's judicial powers are in the 1987 Constitution Article VIII, in particular, for the purposes of this discussion:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.  Judicial power includes [1] the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and [2] to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Above is a much quoted and discussed provision of 1987. So Manolo Quezon's recent links to the sponsorship speech of Justice Roberto Concepcion before the 1986 Constitutional Commission is worth reviewing.  In that speech, one discovers the intent of the Framers of 1987 to give the courts of justice an EXPANDED CERTIORARI POWER, a special power of judicial review not given even to the United States Supreme Court.

Notice that Judicial Power includes two DUTIES of the courts of justice:

(1) to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
(2) to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The first duty is "conventional" and is the usual definition of what Judiciaries do, such as those in the Western traditions of America and England from which our own justice system is largely derived.  Courts of justice SETTLE cases of controversy among persons based on the laws.

The second duty is the much ballyhooed EXPANDED CERTIORARI POWER granted in 1987, which obliges courts of justice, as their duty, to determine the existence of something called grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentality of the Government" in a quantity or degree that "amounts" to a violation of JURISDICTION.

Now look at the very last point Enrile makes:

"But it is my humble view that the Supreme Court, in spite of the fact that it has the power of judicial review, cannot assume jurisdiction over the power, the sole power of this Senate sitting as an impeachment court to try and decide this impeachment case.

 If the Supreme Court is supreme, why can it not assume jurisdiction over the Corona Trial? Because it would be grave abuse of its discretion! ("except for interlocutory matters--so ordered!"-JPE)

I think it is a line in the sand.

((February 14 Valentines Day was Juan Ponce Enrile's 88th birthday. Happy Birthday!))

Enrile Doctrine on Supreme Court and Senate Impeachment Court

Senate President JUAN PONCE ENRILE speaks on the central and most germane topic of the Supreme Court and the Senate Impeachment Court here in Rappler Dot Com. Since everything that comes before is a gimme,  the take away line for me is at the end where JPE says in the clearest possible way.

Look at the very last declarative sentence in JPE peroration on Impeachment:

JPE: "But it is my humble view that the Supreme Court, in spite of the fact that it has the power of judicial review, cannot assume jurisdiction over the power, the sole power of this Senate sitting as an impeachment court to try and decide this impeachment case."

In other words, the Senate Impeachment Court will obey the Law and the laws (of course!) But it will NOT surrender the "JURISDICTION over the sole power" given to it by the 1987 Constitution in Article XI Sec 3.6  to TRY and DECIDE all cases of impeachment (now and until the Constitution is amended!)

This means to me that IF the Supreme Court should attempt to "assume JURISDICTION over the power, the solve power of this Senate sitting as an impeachment court" then the Supreme Court itself could be deemed to be in GRAVE ABUSE of its DISCRETION  amounting to what JPE and SIC and the People would deem to be an UTTER LACK of JURISDICTION under the 1987 Constitution!

Therefore, the Supreme Court CAN be found guilty of Grave Abuse of Discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction should it try to assume the Senate's sole power over impeachment cases under the Constitution under the very Article VIII that it currently uses against the political departments. Everyone should read the EXACT TEXT and not what others say the Constitution says:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The Senate Impeachment Court can make such a finding of Grave Abuse against the Supreme Court itself because it is indubitably a "Court of Justice" as the entirety of the Enrile Doctrine definitely proclaims and upholds.

JPE's lasting contribution to impeachment-related jurisprudence is the establishment of the principle that even Article VIII Section 1 can be made to apply to the grave abuses of discretion by the Supreme Court itself, at least under the auspices of a competent, coordinate, Constitutional Court, like the Senate Impeachment Court! (So ordered!)

On Grave Abuse of Discretion and Betrayal of Public Trust

In trying to answer this question, we must look at two particular articles of the 1987 Constitution.

The judicial power is mentioned in 1987 Constitution Article VIII Section 1 

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the other hand, impeachment power is found in  1987 Constitution Article XI Section 2:

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Lately, I've been thinking a lot about the two phrases "grave abuse of discretion" and "betrayal of public trust" and the 1987 provisions quoted above. I think they are central to the current struggles involving all three branches of the the Government.

Notice that Betrayal of Public Trust is listed as an impeachable offense in 1987 Article Eleven on Accountability of Public Officers. Meanwhile,  Grave Abuse of Discretion is an offense whose existence is now the duty of the courts of justice to determine, under 1987 Article Eight on The Judicial Department.

Under the 1987 Constitution, the Impeachment Power is vested in the Congress (from initiation of a Case of Impeachment to its final and executory judgment after trial and decision by the Senate Impeachment Court).

Meanwhile the Judicial Power  is vested "one Supreme Court" and "in such lower courts as may be established by law." Significantly, Art.VIII Sec. 1.2 defines the Judicial Power as composed of two DUTIES of the COURTS OF JUSTICE: (1) to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable -- which is the traditional role of judiciaries in free democratic countries. and (2) to determine the existence of "grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government."

Above second duty of the "courts of justice" under the 1987 Constitution is often referred to as the EXPANDED CERTIORARI POWER of the Philippine Judiciary. The landmark Supreme Court Decision Francisco Jr. v. House (2003) quotes former Chief Justice Reynato Puno's description of this 1987 innovation:

          In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power.  For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts “x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.”  This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also Xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution.  The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine.  Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,  the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the political question defense.

It is very clear from Puno that Expanded Certiorari Power has become the Superman Suit of the Supreme Court, into which it changes from time to time, not to exercise judicial supremacy, but according to Justice Tinga in Francisco v. House:

      The term “judicial supremacy” was previously used in relation to the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review,[43] yet the phrase wrongly connotes the bugaboo of a judiciary supreme to all other branches of the government. When the Supreme Court mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what it is upholding is not its own supremacy, but the supremacy of the Constitution.[44]  When this supremacy is invoked, it compels the errant branches of government to obey not the Supreme Court, but the Constitution.

Supreme Court Covers Dollar Accounts of Chief Justice Corona

YESTERDAY, a local commercial bank (PS Bank) was granted by the Supreme Court a Temporary Restraining Order (8-5 majority Corona & Velasco abstaining, valid until lifted) to stop the Senate from enforcing subpoenas upon it that would've forced the bank to divulge foreign currency bank accounts of accused Chief Justice Renato Corona to the Prosecution of the Senate Impeachment Trial.   The bank's prayer was immediately heard by the Supreme Court and speedily granted, perhaps because it was solidly based on R.A. 6426 which covers such foreign currency deposits, in particular:

Section 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. – All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under PD No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative, or any other entity whether public or private; Provided, however, That said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. (As amended by PD No. 1035, and further amended by PD No. 1246, prom. Nov. 21, 1977.)

Along with PSBank, the accused Chief Justice Renato Corona also filed with the High Court, an urgent motion for certiorari and prohibition against the Impeachment Complaint and Senate Impeachment Trial itself, for among other things, denying him Due Process. This was according to Serafin Cuevas in court yesterday, describing the nature of the suit filed by the Defense on behalf of the Accused earlier this week (Monday) with the Supreme Court.

Although the PSBank prayer was immediately granted protecting his dollar accounts, the Supreme Court has given the Parties ten days to comment on Corona's prayer to nullify the impeachment complaint and void the trial proceedings to date.

The Senate Impeachment Court proceeded with testimony and evidence yesterday on the PESO ACCOUNTS of the Accused Chief Justice, which are covered by R.A. 1405 with its significant exemption for cases of impeachment:

Sec. 2. 1 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

At one important point, indeed, the Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile himself elicited from the Witness PSBank President confirmation of the existence of ten bank accounts owned by Renato Corona by asking ten times in a row, "Does account number so-and-so exist in your records? (Yes or No)" I do believe some of these accounts are subject of the Supreme Court's TRO covering foreign deposit accounts of the Chief Justice.

SOME PEOPLE ARE ASKING what in the world is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court doing with five secret dollar bank accounts?  that he is now running to his own collegial buddies at Padre Faura to keep absolutely secret from the prying eyes of that rights-trampling crowd at the Senate Impeachment Trial?

Double Jeopardy and Impeachment

JOAQUIN BERNAS in his PDI Commentary today addresses a question I've been discussing in Social Media recently:

One question that must also be asked is whether there is a difference between the meaning of “Guilty” as found in a judicial decision and “Guilty” as found in an impeachment conviction when they are dealing with offenses of equal gravity. 

There is a difference in the result. When a court convicts for treason or bribery, it makes a judgment that the person must make amends through loss of life or liberty. When an impeachment court imposes removal from office, it makes a judgment that there are compelling reasons for shielding the nation from further harm but leaving retribution to the judgment of a court. For that reason, prosecution after conviction on impeachment does not constitute double jeopardy. However, the needed quantum of proof for either criminal conviction or impeachment conviction are not far from each other, if there is a difference at all.

I am puzzled and nonplussed by the concluding statement of Fr. Bernas. for if there were no difference at all in the quanta of proof to convict on impeachment trial AND to convict on criminal trial, why should judgment be limited to removal from public office and not proceed to criminal fine or imprisonment?

I agree of course that it is NOT double jeopardy for impeached Constitutional officers to be tried possibly twice for the same offense: once in the Senate, and upon removal through the regular Courts. But I also don't agree that there ought to be a double burden of criminal prosecution on the state.

It would seem only most reasonable to conclude that the quantum of evidence for conviction upon impeachment trial ought not to rise to the level of technicality and compliance that a later criminal procedure will surely impose any way.

I suppose one important point to uphold is that conviction upon impeachment is not guarantee of conviction upon any subsequent criminal action that might ensue.

High Crimes

1987 Art XI Section 2 names the impeachable offenses:

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

The second week of trial in the impeachment case of Chief Justice Renato Corona ended on a sour note for the Prosecution, as several Senator Judges (Jinggoy, Recto, Chiz) rose up to question the impeachability of offenses Corona is being accused of, or at least what they may amount to if the process of presenting evidence cannot be made more efficient and convincing.

Defense Counsel Justice Serafin Cuevas put a really fine point on it by saying that there were were no criminal or administrative sanctions for unintentional inaccuracies in ones Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth.

Is the Supreme Court Exempt From Silly Midnight Bans?

The ban on midnight appointments in the 1987 Constitution can be found in Art VII Sec. 15 The Executive:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Nothing would seem to be clearer or more definite, and yet on March 17, 2010 the Philippines Supreme Court ruled that appointments to the Supreme Court are exempt from this ban in a Decision penned by J. Bersamin GRP191002 

The Supreme Court today ruled that the prohibition under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the President does not apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.

But it required a breath taking somersault and the dusting off of some hitherto unknown "framers' intentions" from the darkened folios and dim recollections of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:

In its March 17 decision, the Court said that “Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.“

Like so many others who have read this SCoRP decision, I'm disgusted with the Corona Supreme Court  for exempting itself from the long-standing Midnight Ban on Election-Period Appointments by the President in a brazen demonstration of SELF-SERVICE that I believe amounts to a grave abuse of juridical and logical discretion. Well so much for stare decisis non movere? So much for Final Arbiter?

Consider this bit of prose in the Bersamin Ponencia GRP191002:

"...that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,”[33] such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice."

The clause I've highlighted in red in the above paragraph contains a very deceptive and sly piece of reasoning about why the Judicial Department might be exempt from the midnight ban on appointments. It is based on the purely facile observation that the ban is not mentioned in Article VIII on the Judicial Branch of government, but in Article VII on the Executive Branch.  But what could be more obvious?  The 1987 Constitution places the ban on election period appointments in the Executive Branch (1987 Article VII Section 15) for the obvious reason that the appointing power is the Chief Executive. Even more clearly, the ban applies to all presidential appointments to all branches of government, except as noted in the same 1987 provision. 

By their rules shall we bind them

Joaquin Bernas, S.J. worries about a number of things in regards to IMPEACHMENT.

First is whether the impeachment trial is a civil or criminal proceeding. Second is what the Quantum of Evidence and Proof are required to convict. Though Fr. Bernas claims to be exasperated with the term,  I'm quite comfortable with impeachment being a sui generis process, whose nature, practices and rules of procedure are evolving with the institution as the Congress learns how to wield the special Constitutional powers of impeachment granted exclusively and solely to the House and Senate.  The Rules of Senate and House, separately and together with the orders, rulings, proceedings, records, testimonies relating to the Senate Impeachment Court and the trial of the accused Chief Justice Renato Corona are now the body of jurisprudence and official record by which we are giving life to Article XI of the 1987 Constitution on Accountability of Public Officers.

By itself, the text of the 1987 Constitution is necessarily too thin and laconic, to satisfy the intellectual demands of Constitutionalists and ordinary citizens that impeachment be better defined. But look at 1987.XI.Sec3(8):

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

Like a magical link, this provision empowers the House and Senate to literally create whatever RULES on impeachment they need to "effectively carry out the purpose" of impeachment.  The evolution, adoption and utilization of these Rules are a matter of public interest and record and should be open to public debate like any other important matter of public policy.

Fr. Bernas also addressed the matter of what penalties go with conviction by the Senate Impeachment Court. He does not answer a question I still don't have a good answer to: what happens if Accused CJ resigns before a verdict is pronounced. He clearly vacates his post, but is a permanent lifetime ban automatically attached to resignation, or does the Senate have to impose it? How does resignation differ from conviction in regards to subsequent civil and criminal prosecution?

Constitutional Ban on "Midnight Appointments"

The 1987 Constitution expressly commands the President:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

In January, 2010, Constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas opined that anyone accepting an unconstitutional appointment would be an accomplice in the act and be liable for impeachment, as indeed  Renato Corona has found himself to be, impeached and presently on trial in the Senate, after PGMA appointed him Chief Justice just two days before the 2010 May elections.

Bernas' point is crystal clear: Renato Corona in this case has committed a culpable violation of the Constitution by accepting a clearly unconstitutional appointment from President Gloria Arroyo right smack in the middle of the period during which a Constitutional ban exists on such "midnight appointments."

The Alpha List

The so called Alpha List of "local employees" giving their salaries and tax withheld is explained by private prosecutor ARTHUR LIM in the video clip shown by Rappler Dot Com. During yesterday's trial session during which the main prosecution witness was Bureau of Internal Revenue Commissioner Kim Jacinto Henares And some Scream Therapy from Senator-Juror Miriam Defensor Santiago

Article Eleven

The historic trial of the Philippines Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona is covered under Article Eleven of the 1987 Constitution. This article is all about the Accountability of Public Officers--of which there are exactly thirty-one (31) impeachable officials, namely: President, Vice President, Ombudsman, 15 Supreme Court Justices, 7 Comelec, 3 Civil Service, and 3 Audit Commissioners. For convenience I am quoting in full the first 3 sections of the relevant article 11 of the Constitution:

1987 Constitution Art XI 

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. 

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. 

Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. 

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

Eleven Years Ago Today

ELEVEN YEARS AGO TODAY, on Saturday, 20 January 2001, Hilario Davide, was wearing the robes of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court when he strode up to the stage at the Edsa Shrine to swear into office as President of the Republic of the Philippines, its grey-garbed Vice President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.  But it was without legitimacy that he administered this oath, for contrary to the fiction he had forced upon the Court earlier that day, then President Joseph Estrada was not PERMANENTLY DISABLED, as claimed in a towering lie of a fax sent to the Court on behalf of  Mrs. Arroyo (by her then Chief of Staff Renato C. Corona [sic!] )but watching in disbelief from Malacanang Palace, with a gun to his head held by agents of AFP Chief o Staff Angelo Reyes, their co-conspirator in a coup d'etat that would later be hailed as the Edsa 2 People Power Revolution.

I was in the hooting throng that cheered this event as liberation from a corrupt President Estrada, but we did not know of the fiction by which the Supreme Court Chief Justice was acting in utter violation of the 1987 Constitution, did not know that Joseph Estrada would not leave Malacanang until after this incredible turn of events.  Three months later, and based on an alleged diary kept by then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara, the Supreme Court would "construe"--actually they would CONSTRUCT--an Erap resignation, in the landmark ruling Estrada v. Arroyo.

But whatever eloquent arguments are to be found in that decision, the simple fact is that to this day, Joseph Estrada denies he ever resigned, and there is no resignation letter to be found. Moreover, just four days previous, on 16 January 2001, a crucial vote at his Senate impeachment trial, the so-called Second Envelope Vote, proved to one and all that he had at least eleven votes to sustain an eventual and near certain ACQUITTAL in that trial. So that since he had submitted entirely to the processes of impeachment by the House and Trial by the Senate, he had every expectation of being found not guilty of all four charges brought against him. WHY THEN WOULD HE RESIGN except for fear of his life and that of his family at the hands of the mutineers led by Gen. Angelo Reyes in conspiracy with Arroyo and Davide?

ELEVEN YEARS AGO TODAY, a date that is hardly mentioned now in the newspapers or by any one at all, because it is in fact the date of a Filthy Family Secret, the Supreme Court of the Philippines had usurped the "sole power of the Senate to TRY and DECIDE all cases of impeachment." This, it did not by some jurisprudential act or decision, but by authorizing Hilario G. Davide Jr. to simply and illegally swear in the Vice President. Instead of carrying out his duty as Presiding Judge of the Senate Impeachment Court, and pretending to be "preventing violence" Davide threw out the Rule of Law, violated the 1987 Constitution, and forever etched his name in history as a villain who destroyed democratic rule and opened the gates to the ruinous nine year reign of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Related: When Last the Military Withdrew Support

Impeachment as Sui Generis Process

The following is a story I have published at Storify based on a Twitter conversation with Teddy Boy Locsin. It covers several different topics related to the ongoing impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato Corona.

Day Two: Padre Faura Punts, Prosecution Fumbles

Day Two of the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato Corona produced a number of interesting developments.

First, away from the Senate, the Supreme Court did not create a Constitutional Crisis some worried about by issuing a TRO nullifying the Impeachment Complaint of the House of Representatives. Instead the High Court deferred any decision on five separate suits urging Padre Faura to do so, notably that of lawyers Homo Adaza and Alan Paguia based on the accusation that there was no proper verification of the complaint transmitted to the Senate for trial. It gave all parties ten days to submit their Comments.

Second, the first hour or so of the resumed trial proper saw the Senate deny the Prosecution's motion to issue subpoenae to Chief Justice Corona, his wife, children and other relatives summoning them to testify at the trial. The ruling of presiding Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was challenged by Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano, but was upheld upon the subsequent vote 14-6.

Third, the question of the role of private prosecutors on the House team was settled.

Fourth, the subject of blaring headlines tomorrow occurred. The House Prosecution turned out to be unready to present admissible evidence on the matter of the Accused's property holdings, the subject matter of the second charge in the impeachment complaint. It was a near complete rout for the Prosecution as JPE would not accept computer generated material from the Prosecution without the requisite evidentiary verifications of the same and instead, mercifully for the abashed House presenter, Rep. Barzaga, allowed for an immediate adjournment of the session to Wednesday. Trying to put the best face on the embarrassing development House Prosecutors called it "a learning experience." The less flattering characterizations are all over Twitter where #CJonTrial is trending.

Day One Ends in Prosecution Win But Will Supreme Court Take Up Corona's Fight?

Day One of the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato Corona ended in an unequivocal victory for the House Prosecution team. After hearing both sides address the issue of the validity or nullity of the House impeachment complaint, and even allowing the Defense two turns on the key issues of verification and due process based on notice and hearing for the Accused, Presiding Senator-Juror Juan Ponce Enrile DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT the Defense's plea for a full blown judiciary-style Preliminary Hearing.  Citing the House's compliance with Article XI of the Constitution ("exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment") and its own House Rules for doing so, he rejected Defense counsel and former Supreme Court Justice Serafin Cuevas' arguments based on Supreme Court decisions, such as Art Panganiban's ponencia in the Francisco case.

Discussions on Twitter among my correspondents there have centered on what will happen now at the Supreme Court, where hearings on five petitions for a TRO nullifying the House Impeachment Complaint largely on the same grounds as propounded by Cuevas, such as that by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Alan Paguia, are scheduled to start tomorrow 17 Jan 2001.  The BIG QUESTION is whether the Supreme Court will indeed intervene.

One suggestion comes from @ageofbrillig who opines that the Supreme Court is not likely to intervene before a verdict of conviction is rendered by the Senate weeks or months from now. Another comes from Francis Acero (@FrancisAcero) who opines that the High Court might require the Senate to grant the Defense's motion that a full blown Preliminary Hearing be conducted to establish probable cause and touch other judicial bases before proceeding with trial proper.

I think that both scenarios are unlikely for the following reasons.

In the case of @ageofbrillig's scenario of the Supreme Court waiting for a verdict of conviction, there would be by then a huge preponderance of evidence that the accused Chief Justice Renato Corona is in fact guilty of one or more of the eight charges against him.  Public Opinion will surely have hardened by then and with a two thirds majority of the Senators having to concur in such a verdict of guilt, the Supreme Court would have to wage a  huge political battle to reverse not only perception but solid trial evidence and other process that it may have neither the fortitude nor the public support to carry out.  A verdict of conviction would be politically insuperable for it to overcome. Not only would the Court have to retry FACTS it would have to reverse however many rulings and deliberations and votes the Court will by then have accomplished.

As for the notion of @FrancisAcero that the Supreme Court might in the next week or two decide to overrule Juan Ponce Enrile's ruling today, it might occur to them that they would then be risking the ire not only of a House of Representatives that could turn around and impeach one or more of them, but also that of Enrile and the Senators behind him for dissing the Senate Impeachment Court's first major ruling.

I think the Supreme Court will think twice about doing either of these two things, out of either a natural pusillanimity of unelected judges to take on both Houses of Congress with its hardened politicians as well as the Mass Media and the Public, and/or a growing instinct of self-preservation from a fight that only now involves the Chief Justice anyway.  

On a lighter note, I have received some humorous comments on the graphic shown here that I've adopted from the Bill Clinton Impeachment in the United States because the Chief Justice has been at great pains to paint himself as a victim and a saint--even holding Novena Masses at the Supreme Court itself in violation of Freedom of Religion articles in the Constitution and allowing himself to be photographed receiving Communion from Manila Archbishop Juan Luis Tagle and even weeping in confession to Archbishop Oscar Cruz.   The Church has allowed itself to be used as a prop by the Chief Justice, because I believe it is hoping to stop the Reproductive Health Bill in the Supreme Court if and when Congress passes that controversial measure into law and President Aquino signs it.

The Impeachment of Chief Justice Renato Corona

Impeachment Complaint against Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (full text at Chan Robles Law Library)

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, Renato Corona, was impeached by the House of Representatives as authorized by the 1987 Philippine Constitution when 188 Members signed the above Impeachment Complaint against him last December 12, 2011. His trial in the Philippine Senate will commence tomorrow, Monday, January 16, 2012.

Here is a helpful Primer on this historic document and event from Spacelab Infographics.

The Rules of Impeachment in the Philippine Senate were duly adopted last year in preparation for the trial of Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez, but she resigned before the trial could begin. A Primer on the Rules has also been released by the Senate.

A flattering short biography or curriculum vitae of the impeached and accused Chief Justice has been published by Ed Malay on Facebook: Renato Corona: A Life of Grit and Determination.

The trial that begins tomorrow is only the third impeachment (including those of President Joseph Estrada in November, 2000 and Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez in 2010) against a so-called "Constitutional Officer" of the Republic of the Philippines since 1987, of which there are 31: President, Vice President, Ombudsman, 15 Supreme Court Justices, 7 Commission on Election members, 3 of the Civil Service Commission and 3 from the Commission on Audit.

Here is the full text of the the 1987 Philippine Constitution (also at Chan Robles Law).


ABSCBN News has a fairly comprehensive Summary of the Corona Trial  including the Answer of the accused Chief Justice to the Impeachment Complaint and the answers to the Answer from the House Prosecutors.